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reported incurred losses, this article examines the ultimate effects of reforms using the developed losses from a
comprehensive sample of insurers writing medical malpractice insurance from 1984 to 2003. Noneconomic
damages caps are particularly influential in reducing medical malpractice losses and increasing insurer
profitability. The long‐run effects of these reforms are greater than insurers' expected effects; for example, 5‐
and 7‐year developed loss ratios are below the initially reported incurred loss ratios for those years following
the enactment of noneconomic damages caps. Analyses of reported losses consequently understate the
ultimate effects of tort reforms. The quantile regressions show that reforms have the greatest effects for the
firms that are at the high end of the loss distribution.
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Abstract 
Whereas the literature evaluating the effect of tort reforms has focused on reported 
incurred losses, this paper examines the long run effects using a comprehensive sample by state 
of individual firms writing medical malpractice insurance from 1984-2003.  The long run effects 
of reforms are greater than insurers’ expected effects, as five year developed losses and ten year 
developed losses are below the initially reported incurred losses for those years following reform 
measures.  The quantile regressions show the greatest effects of joint and several liability limits, 
noneconomic damages caps, and punitive damages reforms for the firms that are at the high end 
of the loss distribution.  These quantile regression results show stronger, more concentrated 
effects of the reforms than do the OLS and fixed effects estimates for the entire sample. 
* Corresponding author. Please send any comments and suggestions to the author at
patricia.born@csun.edu.
1 
The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurers’ Ultimate Losses 
1. Introduction
Since the 1970s, the medical malpractice insurance industry has experienced several 
periods in which profits have declined rapidly, premiums have risen, and medical providers have 
reported problems with availability and affordability.  To reduce the costs of insurance, many 
states have enacted a variety of tort reform measures that will reduce award and settlement 
amounts.  There have been three distinct ―rounds‖ of tort reform—the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s, 
and the late 1990s.  The influence of such reforms on the medical malpractice insurance industry 
is of renewed interest because there are increased pressures for additional reform efforts.  
Medical malpractice headed the Bush administration’s tort reform agenda, though no national 
reform legislation has been enacted. 
The focus of the reform efforts has been on various measures that will reduce the amount 
of losses incurred by the insured.  Whether such reforms are desirable from a social policy 
standpoint is beyond the scope of this study.  We should note that a decrease in the amount of 
losses borne by the insurer typically implies that less money will be paid to injured parties.  Tort 
reform is generally not strictly a zero sum game, as reduced medical malpractice losses will 
affect insurance premiums, the costs of care, and physician behavior.  However, it is important to 
recognize that the ―savings‖ from decreased losses are not necessarily efficiency gains as they 
may largely reflect reduced transfers to injured patients.  This paper does not address the overall 
social desirability of specific tort reforms but is concerned with the more narrowly framed 
empirical issue of whether the reforms did in fact reduce losses, which was their primary intent. 
The empirical novelty of our analysis is that it is the first study to assess the longer term 
effects of the reforms on losses.  Previous studies of the effect of tort reforms on insurance 
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markets have focused on the effects based on initial reported losses.  Insurance companies 
estimate the ultimate losses associated with premiums paid in given year based on the incurred 
and reported losses associated with these policies as well as on their expectation of the losses that 
will ultimately be incurred for those premiums.  Over time insurers update their loss estimates as 
additional claims are resolved.  These developed loss figures reflect greater experience with how 
the insurance policy has performed.  If tort reforms alter the tort liability landscape so that use of 
previous experience as a guide will make initial projections of losses too high, then one would 
expect to find a greater effect of tort reforms on ultimate losses than on initial losses.  The main 
focus of this paper is on the contrast between the effect of tort reforms on current losses rather 
than developed losses after five years and ten years. 
By considering the effects over this ―longer term,‖ the period of time considered should 
be long enough for: (1) the losses have been nearly fully developed, and (2) the insurer has had 
time to correspondingly adjust premiums to reflect the changes in expected losses.  The 
insurance-related studies of malpractice crises to date have mainly found effects in terms of the 
shorter term results of tort reform, looking at how insurer losses and loss ratios vary across states 
with different sets of reforms.  These studies use reported losses in calculating the influence of 
the reform variables, and thus capture the influence of the reforms as ―perceived‖ by the insurer 
(Barker, 1992; Viscusi et al, 1993; Viscusi and Born, 1995; Born and Viscusi, 1998; and Viscusi 
and Born, 2004).  The results of these studies indicate, among other things, that the most 
influential malpractice reform measure is the cap on noneconomic damages, which have had 
significant effects on reducing incurred losses.   
These findings are further substantiated by the results of a line of research that focuses on 
the effects of the reforms on insurance company closed claim data (Danzon, 1984; Danzon, 
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1986; Sloan et al, 1989; Zuckerman et al, 1990; Yoon, 2001). These studies indicate that caps on 
damages reduce mean payments in medical malpractice cases, which in turn should be reflected 
in insurer losses. 
The studies in the literature of current effects on insurance markets and ultimate effects 
on claims have not examined the potentially differing magnitudes of the current and long run 
effects.  Doing so across different data sets and medical malpractice samples would not provide a 
meaningful basis of comparison because of the different mix of claims and differences in the 
structure of the data.  Our study tracks the performance of a set of firms’ medical malpractice 
policies over time.  The data are drawn from completed insurance forms in which the firm is 
required by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to trade the loss performance 
of its premiums over time to justify the appropriateness of the reserve amounts. 
Yet another line of research on the effects of malpractice tort reforms has focused on the 
effects of the reforms on award payments in court cases (Pace, 2004; Studdert et al., 2004). 
These studies indicate that caps on non-economic damages did, in fact, result in reduced 
payments to plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases in which the jury had awarded non-economic 
damages in excess of the maximum allowable amount.  While of course this result is 
unsurprising, it does confirm that caps do have an impact on tried cases.1  While examination of 
court awards is interesting, focusing on court awards alone ignores the effect of caps on 
settlements and on the selection of cases for litigation, which in turn will affect award levels.  As 
                                               
1 Sharkey (2005) argues that much of the research on the impact of damages caps has ignored the unintended 
consequences of the caps, such as possible ―anchoring‖ by the jury (jurors may learn of the existence of the cap from 
the news media), and the ―crossover effect‖ in which plaintiffs lawyers work harder to increase economic damages 
in states in which non-economic damages are capped (Baker, 1998).  She studied the relationship between damages 
caps and awards in tried cases using cross sectional data obtained from the National Center for State Courts and the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics.  While both the mean and median award were lower in states with damage caps, when 
she controlled for injury severity, county characteristics, litigant characteristics, and whether judges are elected or 
appointed, she found that the relationship was not significant (although the direction and magnitude of the effect in 
her regression equation was consistent with the differences in the means).     
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a result, it provides an incomplete picture of tort reforms’ effects that is also possibly tainted by 
changes over time in the selection of cases for trial.  Our analysis of insurer losses will assess the 
full effects of tort reforms, not simply the effect on a very small component of closed medical 
malpractice claims. 
 Our longer term analysis of the effect of the tort reforms will also provide a more 
accurate and complete perspective on the reform effects.  If tort reforms did not alter the 
temporal profile of losses, then analyses based on reported losses would be an accurate reflection 
of the reform effects.  However, the reform may also alter the time path of subsequent losses 
associated with the policy, given the long tail of medical liability insurance and the time it takes 
for reforms to have their full effect on court awards. An assessment of the ultimate effects of the 
tort reforms on losses requires analysis of the developed losses, which capture the actual court 
and settlement outcomes as influenced by the reforms.  Furthermore, the analysis of the reforms 
over a longer period of time will illustrate whether some types of reforms take longer to work 
their way through the system if, for example, they affect how cases are handled generally so that 
case law has to develop before the effects are realized. 
 In this article, we use a combination of OLS and quantile regression models to assess the 
relationships between various tort reform measures and insurer losses.  To the extent that the 
results differ from earlier studies based on contemporaneous measures of losses and loss 
adjustment expenses, it is because we have additional information on (1) the true impact of the 
malpractice reforms on insurer underwriting performance and (2) the extent to which perceived 
effects of the reforms were actually borne out in the legal system.  We discuss the construction of 
our dataset in the next section. This discussion is followed by an illustration of the substantial 
effect of loss development, which provides further motivation for our particular analytical 
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approach. Our empirical approach and results of our analysis follow, along with our discussion 
and conclusions.  We find that considering the effect of the reforms on losses using both five 
year and ten year development factors shows that the long run effect of the reforms differs 
substantially from the short run effects.  Typically the effects are greater in the long run, but the 
relative impact of the reforms and the distribution of the reform effects throughout the insurance 
market are influenced as well by our use of a longer term perspective.  
  
2. Data and Methodology 
 The empirical analysis uses the financial data that insurers submit annually to the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). These statements contain detailed 
information about the insurer’s underwriting experience, including by-line and by-state 
premiums and losses, overall reserves and by-line developed losses incurred. For our analysis, 
we utilized information from all statements filed by insurers active in underwriting for medical 
malpractice liability between 1984 and 2003.  
 Premiums earned were drawn from the annual statements, Schedule P1 Part F.  We  took 
data on losses incurred and loss development from Schedule P2 Part F.2 For each year in which 
premiums are earned, we obtained contemporaneous losses incurred and the revised estimates of 
losses incurred (i.e., development) in each of the next 9 years.   
 To avoid undue influence of small firm outliers on the results, we exclude from the 
analysis firms that wrote under $1 million in premiums in any given year.  This exclusion did not 
alter the results in any appreciable manner.  As indicated in the summary statistics in Table 1, the 
mean value of premiums earned is $33 million, while losses averaged $38 million. 
                                               
2 In the early 1990s, insurers began reporting separately their premium and loss information for two types of medical 
malpractice policies: claims made and occurrence. An insurer’s business for the two types was simply added for this 
research project, but this distinction will be explored in subsequent research. 
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 Additional variables drawn from the NAIC data include the number of states in which the 
insurer operates and the insurer’s organizational form. Considering the number of states in which 
the insurer operates helps to capture the degree to which the insurer is able to diversify 
operations across different regulatory and legal environments.  Organizational form is included 
in the analysis to reflect possible differentials in administrative costs and agency issues across 
the major forms of insurer ownership: stocks, mutuals, reciprocals, and Lloyds.  The dominant 
insurance company form is that of stock companies, which account for 68 percent of the sample.  
The next largest category is that of mutual insurance companies, which account for 14 percent of 
the sample. 
 Insurer loss development data are only reported at the firm level, and cannot reasonably 
be allocated to state operations. This aspect of the data complicates our analysis of the influence 
of state differences in tort reform activity and regulation on insurer performance. Following Born 
(2001), we created proxy variables to capture the state differences in tort reform and rate 
regulation. For each individual insurer operating in one or more states, we created variables to 
capture the extent to which that insurer is exposed to business in states with a particular 
characteristic, e.g., a reform measure.  Each of these variables was calculated in the same 
manner, using 853,048 firm/state/year-level observations on medical malpractice liability 
premiums written. E.g., the joint and several liability variable for firm i in year t operating in 
states indexed by s is given by 
 
  
(1) 
 
i,s,t
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i,s,t
stist
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where ModifiedJointSevst = 1 for each state, s, with this reform in place in year t, and 0 
otherwise.  The average share values for the four reform measures increase through the sample 
period, indicating that the amount of business written in reformed environments increased, which 
is consistent with state reform activity. The average values for all insurer share variables in 1984, 
1992, and 2003 are shown in Table 2. 
 The prevalence of the tort reform regimes differs across states.  As indicated in Table 1, 
the average share of the business in states with modified joint and several liability is 73 percent, 
and the percentage with modified collateral source rules is 71 percent.  The prevalence of caps 
on noneconomic damages or punitive damages is only 38 percent.   
 Of these various tort reform variables, it is likely that caps on noneconomic damages will 
be most influential.  That has been the pattern found in most previous studies of medical 
malpractice.  Moreover, noneconomic damages comprise the largest component of compensation 
in medical malpractice cases.  Based on closed claims data from Florida and Texas, the 
noneconomic damages share of medical malpractice payments for claims involving adults age 18 
and over is 0.84 for nonfatal cases and 0.75 for fatal cases (Hersch, O’Connell, and Viscusi, 
2007).  Given the prominence of noneconomic damages and reforms that cap these damages, this 
tort reform measure will be the main matter of interest. 
The temporal shifts in the reform variables vary as well, as reflected in Table 2.  In 1984 
there were few of these limitations in place, whereas by 1992 over one third of the insurer share 
of business was in states with modified joint and several liability and modified collateral source 
rules.  By 2003, the average share of business in states with punitive damages caps was just over 
one-third the 1992 level.  The effect these various measures will have on losses will depend not 
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only on their prevalence but also on the extent to which these various reforms impinge on the 
levels of damages that plaintiffs would otherwise receive. 
Table 2 also provides information on the within-year variation in the tort reform and 
regulatory share variables.  For noneconomic damages and punitive damages caps, the standard 
deviations exceed the mean values, while for the other variables the standard deviations within 
years fall just short of the level of the means.  This substantial value of the within-year standard 
deviations relative to their mean effects indicates that the estimation of the effect of tort reforms 
is indentified not only through the temporal variation in these values but also through the 
variation across firms. 
It should be noted that medical malpractice reforms will give rise to a complex set of 
effects, which may affect the estimated values and the interpretation of the results.  We discuss 
these below.  However, it should be emphasized that our focus is not on these various 
mechanisms per se but on whether the effects of tort reform on the developed losses associated 
with premiums written in a given year are greater than the reported loss values for that year.  
This contrast should not be greatly altered by such influences. 
Some of the responses induced by tort reform will be in terms of changes in the behavior 
of physicians.  Following standard economic reasoning and empirical work on defensive 
medicine (Kessler and McClelland, 2002), one would expect malpractice reforms that limit 
damages to lead doctors to take fewer precautions.  There might also be entry into the tort reform 
states by higher risk physicians from other states.  Consequently, the effects observed for reforms 
will be less than would be in the absence of behavioral responses or doctor selection effects.  
Alternatively, if good doctors are attracted to lower liability states, the effect of tort reforms per 
se might be overstated.  Insurance data do not permit resolution of this issue. 
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An alternative possibility is that insurers exit high loss states and select into more 
favorable states.  However, our data indicate very little movement of this type.  Patty? 
 
3. Loss Development 
 Earlier studies of the effects of tort reform on insurer performance made use of current 
year reported loss information. Reported incurred losses include losses paid and an estimate of 
losses incurred but not yet reported. The reported figure represents, to some extent, an insurer’s 
expectations of the ultimate payout for policies in that year.  This expectation is formed by past 
experience, whereby the insurer can use past payout history to estimate the ultimate losses if the 
book of business and types of risks borne by the insurer have not changed markedly.   
 Insurers use a variety of methods to evaluate the development of losses over time. 
Reported losses are adjusted to correct for errors in the estimation of loss reserves.  These errors 
arise from two primary factors: (1) delays in the reporting of claims, and (2) misjudgments in 
calculating the value of claims.  As time passes, the number and value of claims for a particular 
policy year become more evident. The pattern of loss development can be estimated using past 
experience, and this projection is essential to the insurer’s reserving for future losses.   
 The relationship between reported and developed losses has been the focus of several 
different veins of research.  Several studies offer a behavioral perspective, suggesting that 
insurance company managers may intentionally misreport losses to achieve corporate or even 
personal objectives.3  Unintentional misreporting results from unforeseen exogenous influences, 
such as a higher than expected inflation rate which causes higher than expected claims payments 
                                               
3 These errors have direct effects on the insurer’s reported financial results, allowing managers to justify price 
increases (Nelson, 2000), manipulate tax payments, and smooth earnings over time (Grace, 2000).  Over-estimating 
reduces reported earnings, decreases reported capital surpluses, reduces tax liabilities, and can ward off regulatory 
scrutiny (Petroni, 1992; Gaver and Paterson,1999).  
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(Weiss, 1985).  Others have suggested that during periods in which insurance markets are soft 
that firms tend to underprice insurance (Harrington and Danzon, 1994).  Significant errors in loss 
estimates make it difficult to evaluate an insurer’s true financial performance. The implications 
of misreported losses are especially important to reinsurers, who rely greatly on the insurer’s 
estimates of loss development patterns. A recent study suggests that from 1983-1993 property-
casualty insurers were systematically overstating their loss reserves (Bierens and Bradford, 
2005).  By including year fixed effects in the regression analyses, we will seek to control for 
such market-wide influences with a temporal component. 
 In the period we analyze, medical malpractice insurers’ loss expectations must take into 
account the largely unknown effects of state tort reform activity on the legal outcomes for which 
the insurer may be liable. To the extent that past experience does not prove helpful in estimating 
reserves given the shift in the tort liability landscape, we expect that the level of incurred losses 
reported in a given year may be significantly different than the level reported for that same year 
of policies in subsequent years.  
Figure 1 shows the pattern of industry losses based on initial reports and subsequent 
development for the time period we analyze. The figure indicates the reported losses in each year 
as well as the developed losses after five and ten years.  Although the loss statistics follow a 
similar pattern of increases and decreases over time, the gap between reported and developed 
losses is quite different.  In the early 1980s developed losses are higher than initially reported, 
which suggests that the long run loss experience during that period was worse than insurers had 
predicted.  The reverse is true from 1986-1997: developed losses are lower than amounts initially 
reported, and further development, i.e., from 5 years to 10 years, results in additional reductions 
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in the loss amounts.  Although development of losses since 1997 is not complete, the developed 
losses appear to be greater than reported losses.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 If the malpractice tort reforms are influential in affecting insurer performance, then these 
effects will be evident in the level of losses.  Insurer losses are reduced if these reforms have the 
intended effect of decreasing award and settlement amounts and the number of claims that are 
litigated.  Analysis of the effect on losses consequently provides a more direct test of the effect 
of the reforms than would analysis of the effect on loss ratios, which is an inverse measure of 
insurance profitability.  Indeed, the more rapidly the effects of tort reforms are passed through to 
insurance purchasers through lower premiums, the more one will understate the actual 
consequences of the tort reform.  In addition, the central focus of the analysis is on the contrast 
between the effect of tort reforms on current losses and the effect on developed losses.  The 
premium levels are the same in each instance.  Our analysis of loss ratios effects yielded results 
similar to those found for losses. 
We begin by presenting a baseline ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation to 
obtain estimates of the reform effects on reported losses, using the following loss equation for 
firm i at time t: 
 
Log Losses Incurredit = (1) 
        t + 1 Log Premiums Earnedit 
 + 2 ShareJSit + 3 ShareCSit + 4 SharePDit + 5 ShareNDit 
+ 6 Shareregit + 7 Log Number of Statesit  
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+ 8 Lloydsi + 9 Mutuali + 10 Reciprocali +  11 TBilli + ijt. 
 
 Equation 1 and all subsequent equations allow for time-specific fixed effects t.  
Influences common to specific years, such as effects of the underwriting cycle, consequently will 
be reflected in this set of year-specific fixed effects. 
 Following the approach in most previous analyses of tort reform, we assume that 
endogeneity of tort reforms and losses is not a major problem.  As our analysis will indicate, the 
current period losses do not reflect the ultimate value of the losses associated with these 
premiums but will be governed to a large extend by expectations based on past loss performance.  
Our analysis of the effect of logged values of the tort reform measures rather than 
contemporaneous values yields similar results to those found because there is not a great deal of 
temporal variation in the presence of the tort reforms.  Including the one-period logged value of 
the tort reform measures the elimination of one year of data.  In a similar vein, tort liability 
reform doesn’t typically affect contemporaneous premium levels, as values are set based on the 
previous years’ lost experience.  California’s recent efforts to couple workers’ compensation 
reform with lower premium levels is a rare exception.  More common is the Texas medical 
malpractice experience in which the damages cap legislation enacted in 2003 led to a legislative 
proposal in 2005 (HR 1665) to commission a state insurance commission study of the effect of 
the noneconomic damages caps on premiums.  Such effects involve policy responses that are not 
contemporaneous with tort reform. 
To allow for the influence of omitted insurer characteristics, we also estimate the OLS 
equation using a firm-specific fixed effects model as well. The model takes the form: 
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Log Losses Incurredit = (2) 
        t + ∑ i Firmi + 1 Log Premiums Earnedit 
 + 2 ShareJSit + 3 ShareCSit + 4 SharePDit + 5 ShareNDit 
+ 6 Shareregit + 7 Log Number of Statesit  
+ 8 Lloydsi + 9 Mutuali + 10 Reciprocali +  11 TBilli + ijt. 
 
where Firmi is a 0-1 dummy variable for firm i (i = 2,…N), and the estimates of i capture the 
presence of any statistically significant group effects.  The firm-specific fixed effects model is 
only feasible with OLS, not the subsequent quantile regressions. 
 The influence of the tort reforms may vary depending on the type of reform and the 
nature of the insurer’s loss exposure.  If the reforms work to limit award amounts, rather than 
completely eliminating them, then the effects of such measures should increase with the size of 
the financial stakes involved in the case.  Likewise, we would expect little effect on cases that 
are very small.  The reforms are therefore likely to be particularly influential in dampening the 
losses of firms that are at the high end of the loss distribution.  To evaluate the potential 
differential influence on loss levels of the reform measures we utilize a quantile regression 
analysis.  Equation (3) is the quantile regression counterpart of the modified version of our linear 
regression (1): 
Quant  (Log Losses x) = x,   (3) 
where  is the vector of coefficients for the explanatory variables x at the τth percentile.4  More 
specifically, the estimates will determine the differential effects of the variables x at the 10th, 
                                               
4 See Koenker and Bassett (1978, 1982) for a description of the approach. 
14 
 
25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of the log loss ratio distribution.5  The estimator for our 
quantile regression model is 
,)]()1()([
n
1
1
iiiiii
n
i
LRLRLR  
where the sample size is n and  is an indicator function that assumes a value of 1 when the 
inequality holds; otherwise, it is zero.  To estimate the asymptotic standard errors we use a 
bootstrapping technique. 
 Results of estimating equations (1) - (3) for reported losses are shown in Table 3. All 
standard errors reported are robust with respect to heteroskedasticity.  As expected, the 
contemporaneous value of premiums earned is strongly related to the insurer’s reported loss 
experience for every set of results.6  For the initial OLS specification, a 1 percent increase in 
premiums has an almost identical percentage effect on losses.  In the first OLS model including 
year-specific effects but not firm-specific fixed effects, two of the four tort reform variables have 
a significant negative effect on losses: noneconomic damages reforms and punitive damages 
reforms.  Somewhat surprisingly, joint and several liability reform has a positive effect, which is 
consistent with the mixed performance of this reform type in previous studies.  Prior approval 
rate regulation raises the value of losses, which one would expect if regulatory stringency boasts 
the expected level of losses for any given value of premiums. 
                                               
5 The quantile regression at, for example, the 90th percentile will fit an equation such that 90 percent of the sum of 
the absolute value of the residuals will involve negative errors and 10 percent will be positive.  The large loss firms 
will tend to be captured at this high quantile.  Because we include a measure of earned premiums in the equation, the 
―large loss‖ firms are those firms with high losses given their premiums; they are not necessarily the large firms.  
6 Since the reform effects are evaluated using firm-level data, the estimated effects are not directly comparable to 
those obtained earlier using firm-state-level data.  Nevertheless, the significant results are consistent with earlier 
findings (See Born & Viscusi, 1998). 
Min 
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 The second OLS equation in Table 3 includes both firm-specific fixed effects and year-
specific fixed effects, thus capturing much of the variation in the tort reform measures.  Only the 
joint and several liability tort reform measure is statistically significant. 
 The quantile regression effects results in Table 3 provide a different perspective in that 
these results make it possible for us to analyze the incidence of the reform effects across different 
percentiles of the loss distribution.  Consider the effect of noneconomic damages cap limits.  
Those firms with losses at the upper end of the loss distribution benefit the most from tort 
reforms, as this variable has an increasingly negative effect beginning at the median loss quantile 
and peaking at the 90th percentile.  Punitive damages camps likewise are not statistically 
significant at the 10th percentile but begin to have an effect at the 25th percentile, which becomes 
increasingly great at the 90th percentile.  The effects of joint and several liability and collateral 
damages reforms are more mixed across the quantiles.  Overall, any restraining effect of the 
reforms appears to be largely concentrated at the upper tail.   
 Similarly, the role of regulatory restrictions in terms of prior approval state insurance 
regulatory regimes is also greatest for the high loss quantiles.  At the 75th and 90th percentiles, 
rate regulation of this type significantly raises losses. 
 The largest effects of the reforms directed at limiting damages are consistently for firms 
that would otherwise have experienced the largest losses.  To the extent that these firms are the 
same firms from year to year, tort reforms benefit the firms with the highest risk portfolios, 
which perhaps are also the most inefficient firms.  However, if the large losses stem from 
unreasonably high outlier medical malpractice awards, which is an assumption upon which much 
tort reform is based, then the effects of tort reform across the distribution of losses have a more 
favorable interpretation.  More simply, to the extent that many tort reform measures are 
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structured to eliminate very large losses by capping the noneconomic damages component of 
awards, almost tautologically there will be an effect in reducing the awards that otherwise would 
have been much larger. 
 The reported losses that are the basis for the estimates in Table 3 are largely estimated, so 
that it is useful to assess whether the performance of actual loss experiences accord with what 
insurers expected their losses to be. By evaluating the effects of the reforms on developed losses, 
we can assess whether their expectations were correct.  Moreover, analysis of developed losses 
provides a more accurate picture of the ultimate effects of the reform measures. Tables 4 and 5 
present the results of estimating equations (1) - (3), where the dependent variables are losses 
developed to the 5th year and losses developed to the 10th year, respectively.  While Table 3 
contains all insurers writing medical malpractice insurance between 1984 and 2003, the time 
periods covered in Table 4 (1984-1998) and Table 5 (1984-1993) are necessarily reduced.  
 The effects of the tort reforms on losses tend to be greater in the developed loss estimates 
in Tables 4 and 5, as one might expect if the reforms reduced not only initial reported losses but 
also the subsequent temporal distribution of losses.  One would also expect the influence of loss 
development to diminish over time as the resolution of claims by the fifth year as compared to 
the first year will embody a greater contrast than a comparison of the tenth year with the fifth 
year. 
 The most pronounced effect of considering developed losses is with respect to the key 
noneconomic damages reform variable.  For quantile regressions for fifth year and tenth year 
developed losses, reported in Tables 4 and 5, the noneconomic damages cap begins to have a 
statistically significant negative effect on losses.  The largest effects of this variable are at the 
90th percentile, with the largest point estimate observed for tenth year developed losses.   
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Analysis of the developed loss experience as analyzed using quantile regressions 
indicates an effect of reforms on the distribution of losses that is quite different from reported 
loss regressions.  The main effect of the reform efforts is concentrated among the firms that 
would otherwise have exhibited the worst loss experience.  The estimates for the tenth year 
developed losses indicate that a 10 percent increase in the share of business in states with 
noneconomic damages caps is associated with loss reductions of x percent at the 90th percentile. 
 The other tort reform variables are less consistently significant for the fifth year and tenth 
year developed loss equations, which suggests that the effects observed for reported losses are 
spurious.  The observed effects largely are the result of initial loss reports and insurer 
expectations rather than the actual loss experience.  Punitive damages are awarded in under 3 
percent of all medical malpractice cases that plaintiffs win after a jury trial (Hersch and Viscusi, 
2004), so that the absence of any significant effect of the punitive damages cap variable on losses 
accords with the legal structure.  Joint and several liability reforms have a significant effect only 
at the 10th percentile for fifth year losses, which consequently appears to be spurious.  The 
collateral source reform variable is more consistently significant in both the fifth year developed 
loss quantile equations and the twelfth year developed loss equations.  Apparently collateral 
source reforms have a restraining effect on large stakes claims but not on very large firm losses. 
 The role of the prior approval regulation follows the opposite pattern of the noneconomic 
damages variable.  Prior approval regulation leads to higher losses, where these losses are 
concentrated at the median and above in Tables 4 and 5.  The greatest effects of prior approval 
regulation are at the 90th percentile. 
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Conclusion 
 Earlier work suggested that certain malpractice tort reforms have the intended effect in 
reducing malpractice losses reported by insurance companies.  Examination of initial reported 
losses provides a mixed picture with respect to the influence of tort reform.  Noneconomic 
damages and punitive damages reforms have a negative effect on losses, but joint and several 
liability reforms have a positive effect.  The effects of the reforms on the reported loss 
distribution is also mixed.   
 By shifting the focus of the analysis to the effect on developed losses, the patterns on 
influence become much more narrowly focused.  The only consistently influential tort reform of 
consequence is that of noneconomic damages caps.  The effect of these caps is greatest at the 
higher loss quantiles, with the greatest effect at the 90th percentile.  Developed losses after five 
and ten years embody the actual loss experience to a much greater extent than do reported losses.  
Thus, they provide a much more accurate reflection of the actual consequences of tort reforms on 
paid losses as opposed to insurers’ expectations of what these losses may be. 
 In much the same manner, insurance regulation has a differential effect as well, with the 
greatest effect being a boosting of loss levels for the upper loss quantiles.  However, unlike the 
tort reform measures, this effect of prior approval regulation is consistent whether one examines 
reported losses or developed losses.  This similarity is not surprising because there is little 
change across the sample period in the fraction of business subject to prior approval regulation, 
as it increased from 0.32 to 0.34 from 1984 to 2003.  In the absence of changes with respect to 
the insurance regulation regime, insurers’ historically based expectations as embodied in 
reported loss levels should be more in line with actual loss patterns.  In contrast, the fraction of 
business affected by noneconomic damages caps rose from 0.11 to 0.47.  Expectations regarding 
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losses that are governed by experiences before the presence of the caps will understate the effect 
that the caps will have.  Developed losses show a greater effect of noneconomic damages caps 
on the upper end of the loss distribution than does the analysis of reported losses.  Actual 
developed loss patterns provide a more accurate and in many respects more narrowly focused 
and quite different perspective on the effects of tort liability reforms on medical malpractice 
insurance markets. 
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Table 1. Sample means, 1984-2003 (N=2177) 
 
Variable Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Premiums Earned (in millions) 33.828 
(71.261) 
Losses Incurred – Current Year (in millions) 37.941 
(85.408) 
Share of Business 
in States with:  
Modified Joint & Several Liability 0.726 
(0.355) 
Modified Collateral Sources Rule 0.708 
(0.349) 
Noneconomic Damages Cap 0.382 
(0.371) 
Punitive Damages Cap 0.307 
(0.355) 
Prior Approval Rate Regulations 0.529 
(0.360) 
Number of States in which Insurer Writes Med Mal 14.775 
(17.903) 
Organizational 
Form 
Stock 0.675 
(0.468) 
Mutual 0.138 
(0.345) 
Reciprocal Exchange 0.114 
(0.318) 
Lloyds <0.001 
(0.021) 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The sample includes only insurers 
that write more than $1 million in premiums. The number of insurers in the sample ranges from 
33 to 162 per year. 
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Table 2. Average share of insurer business  
in states with tort reforms and prior approval rate regulation 
 
 
Share variable 
Mean 
1984 
Mean 
1992 
Mean 
2003 
Modified Joint & Several Liability 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.642 
(0.414) 
0.540 
(0.435) 
Modified Collateral Source Rule 0.113 
(0.212) 
0.619 
(0.406) 
0.590 
(0.425) 
Noneconomic Damages Cap 0.080 
(0.179) 
0.294 
(0.377) 
0.262 
(0.340) 
Punitive Damages Cap 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.187 
(0.311) 
0.340 
(0.385) 
Prior Approval Rate Regulation 0.307 
(0.320) 
0.461 
(0.390 
0.418 
(0.395) 
 
* Sources include the American Medical Association (2004), the American Tort Reform 
Association, and individual state statutes. 
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Figure 1.   Industry Losses using Reported, 5-year and 10-year Developed Losses, 1980-2003 
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Table 3. OLS and Quantile Regression Results. Dependent Variable = Reported Losses 
 
 OLS 
(with robust 
std errs) 
OLS  
w/fixed 
effects 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Ln(Premiums Earned) 1.079*** 
(0.009) 
0.835*** 
(0.022) 
1.117*** 
(0.011) 
1.091*** 
(0.006) 
1.082*** 
(0.004) 
1.061*** 
(0.007) 
1.023*** 
(0.009) 
Ln(Share PW in States w/ 
Noneconomic damages cap) 
-0.171*** 
(0.048) 
0.099 
(0.075) 
-0.075 
(0.078) 
-0.028 
(0.029) 
-0.059* 
(0.030) 
-0.105*** 
(0.032) 
-0.179*** 
(0.040) 
Ln(Share PW in States w/ 
Punitive damages cap) 
-0.114*** 
(0.043) 
-0.076 
(0.077) 
-0.052 
(0.053) 
-0.102*** 
(0.035) 
-0.080*** 
(0.031) 
-0.098** 
(0.040) 
-0.203*** 
(0.051) 
Ln(Share PW in Joint/Several 
Reformed States) 
0.201*** 
(0.067) 
0.166* 
(0.090) 
0.056 
(0.076) 
0.039 
(0.027) 
0.069** 
(0.035) 
0.060 
(0.062) 
0.076* 
(0.040) 
Ln(Share PW in Collateral 
Source Reformed States) 
-0.117 
(0.073) 
-0.073 
(0.083) 
-0.122* 
(0.074) 
-0.053 
(0.040) 
-0.047* 
(0.030) 
-0.031 
(0.056) 
-0.066 
(0.062) 
Ln(Share PW in States with Prior 
Approval) 
0.097* 
(0.050) 
0.049 
(0.098) 
-0.025 
(0.046) 
0.037 
(0.030) 
0.023 
(0.031) 
0.067* 
(0.034) 
0.184*** 
(0.062) 
Ln(Number of States) -0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.077*** 
(0.018) 
-0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.034*** 
(0.004) 
-0.041*** 
(0.007) 
-0.037 
(0.007) 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
Mutual 0.059 
(0.042)  
-0.013 
(0.065) 
0.103*** 
(0.021) 
0.028 
(0.024) 
-0.030 
(0.026) 
-0.020 
(0.046) 
Lloyds -4.685*** 
(0.415)  
-1.144 
(1.161) 
-3.218* 
(1.771) 
-5.264** 
(2.592) 
-6.602** 
(3.345) 
-6.762* 
(3.497) 
Reciprocal -0.024 
(0.045) 
 0.003 
(0.056) 
0.089*** 
(0.032) 
0.043** 
(0.020) 
-0.027 
(0.023) 
-0.079*** 
(0.029) 
Intercept -1.406*** 
(0.424) 
0.168 
(0.215) 
-5.259*** 
(0.874) 
-2.971*** 
(0.613) 
-0.853 
(0.623) 
0.655*** 
(0.121) 
1.126*** 
(0.337) 
 
Adjusted R2† 0.888 
 
0.864 0.683 0.752 0.774 0.768 0.742 
†Overall R2 for fixed effects model and pseudo R2 for quantile regressions 
***, ** and * indicate estimated coefficients that are significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels, respectively. 
Note: all equations include dummy variables for years 1985-2003. 
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Table 4. OLS and Quantile Regression Results. Dependent Variable = Developed Losses, fifth year 
 
 OLS 
w/robust 
std errs 
OLS  
w/fixed 
effects 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Ln(Premiums Earned) 1.093*** 
(0.016) 
0.844*** 
(0.034) 
1.200*** 
(0.022) 
1.115*** 
(0.012) 
1.074*** 
(0.008) 
1.022*** 
(0.014) 
0.981*** 
(0.017) 
Ln(Share PW in States w/ 
Noneconomic damages cap) 
-0.247*** 
(0.066) 
0.029 
(0.101) 
-0.123 
(0.104) 
-0.207*** 
(0.051) 
-0.211*** 
(0.033) 
-0.242*** 
(0.053) 
-0.371*** 
(0.077) 
Ln(Share PW in States w/ 
Punitive damages cap) 
-0.004 
(0.064) 
0.002 
(0.109) 
-0.040 
(0.073) 
-0.049 
(0.075) 
0.005 
(0.056) 
0.024 
(0.081) 
0.146 
(0.104) 
Ln(Share PW in Joint/Several 
Reformed States) 
-0.308*** 
(0.107) 
0.308*** 
(0.123) 
0.407*** 
(0.150) 
0.119 
(0.082) 
0.099 
(0.062) 
0.008 
(0.096) 
0.205 
(0.175) 
Ln(Share PW in Collateral 
Source Reformed States) 
-0.288*** 
(0.106) 
-0.129 
(0.118) 
-0.515*** 
(0.149) 
-0.174*** 
(0.051) 
-0.079 
(0.067) 
0.002 
(0.099) 
-0.181 
(0.131) 
Ln(Share PW in States with Prior 
Approval) 
0.211*** 
(0.066) 
0.086 
(0.140) 
0.125* 
(0.072) 
0.121 
(0.049) 
0.175*** 
(0.045) 
0.209*** 
(0.059) 
0.403*** 
(0.093) 
Ln(Number of States) -0.010 
(0.015) 
0.078*** 
(0.027) 
-0.029 
(0.025) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.034* 
(0.018) 
Mutual 0.002 
(0.091)  
-0.103 
(0.099) 
0.073 
(0.048) 
0.083* 
(0.045) 
0.017 
(0.055) 
0.119 
(0.090) 
Lloyds -1.500*** 
(0.417)  
2.016 
(1.309) 
0.063 
(0.312) 
-1.697* 
(1.009) 
-3.353** 
(1.629) 
-3.411** 
(1.714) 
Reciprocal -0.029 
(0.060)  
0.050 
(0.081) 
0.109** 
(0.047) 
0.036 
(0.029) 
-0.002 
(0.052) 
-0.031 
(0.050) 
Intercept -1.454*** 
(0.438) 
0.288*** 
(0.1318) 
-5.838*** 
(1.540) 
-3.197*** 
(0.588) 
-1.110 
(0.705) 
0.969*** 
(0.190) 
1.359*** 
(0.266) 
 
Adjusted R2† 0.825 
 
0.806 0.606 0.659 0.684 0.689 0.670 
 
†Overall R2 for fixed effects model and pseudo R2 for quantile regressions 
***, ** and * indicate estimated coefficients that are significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels, respectively. 
Note: all equations include dummy variables for the years 1985-1998. 
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Table 5. OLS and Quantile Regression Results. Dependent Variable = Developed Losses, tenth year 
OLS 
w/robust 
std errs 
OLS 
w/fixed 
effects 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Ln(Premiums Earned) 1.087*** 
(0.021) 
0.778*** 
(0.052) 
1.201*** 
(0.036) 
1.133*** 
(0.021) 
1.063*** 
(0.009) 
0.989*** 
(0.017) 
0.937*** 
(0.024) 
Ln(Share PW in States w/ 
Noneconomic damages cap) 
-0.174**
(0.088)
0.045 
(0.168) 
-0.019
(0.108)
-0.195**
(0.086)
-0.121**
(0.052)
-0.292***
(0.095)
-0.414***
(0.098)
Ln(Share PW in States w/ 
Punitive damages cap) 
0.044 
(0.089) 
0.061 
(0.184) 
0.074 
(0.144) 
0.044 
(0.115) 
-0.064
(0.086)
-0.066
(0.115)
-0.033
(0.131)
Ln(Share PW in Joint/Several 
Reformed States) 
0.244*** 
(0.119) 
0.266 
(0.196) 
0.350 
(0.224) 
0.104 
(0.106) 
0.066 
(0.091) 
-0.089
(0.105)
0.104 
(0.144) 
Ln(Share PW in Collateral 
Source Reformed States) 
-0.340***
(0.128)
-0.137
(0.184)
-0.511***
(0.167)
-0.311***
(0.080)
-0.186**
(0.078)
-0.011
(0.069)
-0.232
(0.150)
Ln(Share PW in States with Prior 
Approval) 
0.152* 
(0.091) 
0.150 
(0.227) 
0.090 
(0.166) 
0.103 
(0.078) 
0.127** 
(0.064) 
0.200** 
(0.080) 
0.268** 
(0.129) 
Ln(Number of States) -0.002
(0.018)
0.257*** 
(0.044) 
-0.030
(0.034)
0.018 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
Mutual 0.035 
(0.097) 
-0.008
(0.153)
0.120** 
(0.060) 
0.063 
(0.066) 
-0.003
(0.069)
-0.008
(0.079)
Lloyds -1.519***
(0.413)
1.069 
(0.730) 
0.276 
(0.637) 
-2.120*
(1.156)
-3.329**
(1.367)
-3.495**
(1.664)
Reciprocal 0.066 
(0.082) 
0.214** 
(0.100) 
0.183*** 
(0.069) 
0.143*** 
(0.045) 
0.099** 
(0.046) 
0.023 
(0.076) 
Intercept -1.283***
(0.453)
0.716*** 
(0.478) 
-4.799***
(0.787)
-3.451***
(0.854)
-0.497
(0.625)
1.318*** 
(0.133) 
1.901*** 
(0.270) 
Adjusted R2† 0.786 0.680 0.562 0.607 0.634 0.650 0.638 
†Overall R2 for fixed effects model and pseudo R2 for quantile regressions 
***, ** and * indicate estimated coefficients that are significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% significance levels, respectively. 
Note: all equations include dummy variables for the years 1984-1993. 
